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Abstract 
 The wage premiums for firm-level foreign exposure (exporting and foreign ownership) 
have been well documented in the literature, and their potential sources have been studied in 
depth.  Compensating differentials and efficiency wages are two distinct explanations (with 
radically different implications for worker welfare) for wage gaps that persist between firms 
despite controls for firm and worker characteristics.  We use a comprehensive dataset of working 
conditions and wage compliance in Cambodia’s exporting garment factories to explore (1) the 
impact of foreign ownership on wages and working conditions, (2) whether the relationship 
between wages and working conditions within these exporting factories more closely resembles 
efficiency wage or compensating differential theory and (3) whether the wage-working 
conditions relationship differs between domestically owned and foreign-owned firms.   
 We find that foreign ownership increases compliance on both wages and working 
conditions, contradicting the contention that higher wages in foreign-owned firms compensate 
workers for worse working conditions.  In addition, we find a robust positive relationship 
between wages and working conditions in the sample as a whole, suggesting that efficiency 
wages or a similar theory more accurately explains the behavior of these exporting firms than 
compensating differentials.  This positive relationship is stronger in domestically owned firms 
than in foreign-owned firms, but the relationship remains positive, fairly large, and statistically 
significant even in foreign-owned firms.  Due to the lack of evidence in support of compensating 
differential theory, we conclude that both foreign ownership and exogenously imposed 
improvements in working conditions improve net worker welfare. 
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 Despite the conventional wisdom that foreign-owned factories in developing countries 
operate as “sweatshops,” paying low wages and providing unpleasant work environments, many 
studies have shown that wages are higher in foreign-owned firms than in their otherwise identical 
domestically owned counterparts.1  The literature has also shown that exporting firms pay higher 
wages than non-exporting firms,2 lending further support to the notion that working in a 
“globalized” firm benefits workers.  These results are encouraging, but they do not necessarily 
imply that exposure to foreign markets improves worker welfare overall.  If higher wages 
compensate workers for poor working conditions, workers may be no better off in these firms.  
If, on the other hand, wages do not decline as working conditions improve, workers may be 
made better off by working in a foreign-owned or exporting firm.  Determining the presence (or 
absence) of compensating differential relationships in exporting and foreign-owned firms is thus 
critical to understanding the impact of globalization on workers in developing countries.   
 The literature consistently reveals positive wage premiums in exporting and foreign-
owned firms relative to non-exporting and domestically owned firms, but the source of these 
wage premiums remains unclear.  Using a detailed dataset of exporting factories in Cambodia, 
this paper explores (1) how wages and working conditions differ between domestically and 
foreign-owned firms, (2) whether compensating differentials explain the wage changes that occur 
within the full sample of domestically and foreign-owned exporting firms over time and (3) 
whether the relationship between wages and working conditions differs between domestically 
and foreign-owned firms.  We find that foreign-owned firms are more compliant than 
domestically owned firms on both wages and working conditions, suggesting that compensating 
differentials cannot explain the foreign ownership wage premium in these factories.  In addition, 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Aitken et al. (1996), Girma and Görg (2007), and Sjöholm and Lipsey (2006). 
2
 Bernard and Jensen (1995), Glick and Roubaud (2006), and Schank et al. (2007) are a few examples. 
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good working conditions are positively related to wages within firms, suggesting that 
improvements in working conditions do not induce firms to reduce wages.  This positive 
relationship is stronger in domestically owned firms, but is also positive, relatively large, and 
statistically significant in foreign-owned firms.  Due to this evidence contradicting compensating 
differential theory both between domestically and foreign-owned firms and within firms, we 
move one step closer to the conclusion that both foreign ownership and improvements in 
working conditions make workers in these factories better off overall. 
 Firms exposed to foreign markets tend to pay higher wages, even when controlling for a 
variety of factors.  Several studies, in both developing and developed countries, have shown that 
foreign-owned firms pay higher wages than their domestically owned counterparts, controlling 
for many firm and worker characteristics.  Aitken et al. (1996), Girma and Görg (2007), and 
Sjöholm and Lipsey (2006), are just a few examples of such studies.3  Exporting firms also tend 
to pay higher wages than non-exporting firms, controlling for a variety of firm characteristics. 
Several studies have verified this trend in a variety of contexts, from manufacturing plants in the 
U.S. (Bernard and Jensen 1995) 4 to Export Processing Zones in Madagascar (Glick and 
Roubaud 2006) to exporting firms in Germany (Schank et al. 2007).  Though a few other studies 
have failed to show evidence of this relationship, the preponderance of the evidence seems to 
suggest that exporting firms pay higher wages than non-exporting firms. 
 Compensating differentials and efficiency wages, two theories with opposite implications 
for worker welfare, are the literature’s dominant explanations for wage gaps that persist between 
firms despite controls for firm characteristics. The evidence supporting the efficiency/fair wage 
                                                 
3
 See Brown et al. (2002) or Lipsey (2004) for a more comprehensive review of the literature on the ownership-
wage relationship.  
4
 The wage premium in exporting firms persists despite a variety of controls and plant-level fixed effects. Though 
the bulk of the premium is explained by other firm-level controls like plant size, capital intensity, hours per worker, 
industry, and location, the premium for exporting firms remains. 
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model is extensive, indicating that firms often pay above-market wages to harness productivity 
gains.  Empirical evidence has shown that paying efficiency wages reduces shirking (Cappelli 
and Chauvin 1991), increases worker effort (Goldsmith et al. 2000), increases worker 
productivity (Fuess and Millea 2002), and increases the firm’s market share through those 
productivity gains (Konings and Walsh 1994).  Arai (1994) finds indirect evidence that firms are 
using higher wages to reduce shirking, showing that Swedish inter-industry wage differentials 
are strongly and positively related to levels of worker autonomy.  The literature thus suggests the 
presence of efficiency wage behavior among firms, a sign that higher wages could signal a net 
improvement in welfare for the workers receiving them (since the higher wages yield output 
increases for the firm, thereby eliminating the need for cost-cutting working conditions 
reductions in response to the wage increases). 
 Empirical tests of compensating differential theory, meanwhile, have turned up mixed 
results.  While many have found evidence of compensating differentials for accident risk 
(Cousineau et al. 1992; Marin and Psacharopoulos 1982), occupation- and industry-level work-
related mortality risk  (Leigh 1991), hard, physical, or stressful work (Duncan and Holmlund 
1983; Duncan and Stafford 2002 [1980]) and inconvenient work hours (Duncan and Holmlund 
1983; McNabb 1989; Altonji and Paxson 1988), others have found little evidence of 
compensating differentials for these working conditions and others (Brown 1980; Dorman and 
Hagstrom 1998; McCrate 2005).5  In addition to its inconsistent support for compensating 
differential theory, the literature is also entirely comprised of worker-level studies despite the 
firm’s essential role in determining wages and working conditions. The mixed results in the 
literature may be due in part to this lack of firm-level studies.  Nonetheless, the results suggest 
                                                 
5
 A few studies apply compensating differential theory to industry-level export wage premiums (using worker-level 
data), and they too find little or no evidence of compensating differentials in El Salvador (Robertson and Trigueros-
Argüello 2008), Indonesia (Robertson et al. 2008), and Cambodia (Robertson and Neak 2008). 
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that workers might gain a net increase in welfare from higher wages, but the higher wages 
sometimes compensate them for otherwise worse working conditions. 
 The scarcity of firm-level working conditions data has so far meant that studies of the 
firm’s choice between employing efficiency wages or compensating differentials in worker 
compensation are very rare.  Furthermore, the minimal diversity of working conditions measures 
available in most datasets, even at the worker level, has prevented a close examination of the full 
package of wages and working conditions offered.  Finally, while many have compared wages in 
domestically and foreign-owned firms, none have studied whether the higher wages in foreign-
owned firms are connected to worse working conditions.  This paper, using a comprehensive 
dataset of working conditions in Cambodia’s exporting garment factories from the Better 
Factories Cambodia (BFC) program, explores this wage-working conditions relationship to 
evaluate the net impact of foreign ownership and working conditions improvements on worker 
welfare. 
 The influence of the Better Factories Cambodia program (described in section three) in 
these firms provides a unique situation with great empirical potential.  While most firm-level 
studies must rely on various immeasurable or random exogenous shocks for their data variation, 
BFC provides a common and known shock across firms, applying pressure on all firms to 
improve working conditions and wage compliance.6  With this great empirical strength of the 
dataset, however, come two limitations of note.  First of all, the dataset contains only measures 
of wage compliance, not of worker compensation itself.  We therefore use an index of five 
measures of wage compliance (explained in detail in section three) to proxy for wages.  
Secondly, because the dataset is entirely comprised of exporting firms, we cannot explore both 
                                                 
6
 This is not to say that the BFC effect is uniform across firms, but we account for the heterogeneity of the BFC 
effect with firm-level controls for the cumulative number of BFC visits and their frequency. 
 6 
the exporting and ownership dimensions of the effect of foreign exposure on the wage-working 
conditions relationship.    
 Instead, we explore the impact of foreign ownership within this sample of exporting firms 
in three steps.  First (in section four), we identify the positive effect of foreign ownership on both 
wages and working conditions in these firms, controlling for observable firm characteristics.  
This finding contributes to the limited literature on the foreign ownership wage premium, but 
says nothing about how the firms choose combinations of wages and working conditions over 
time, particularly in response to a shock.  We therefore examine the wage-working conditions 
relationship within firms over time, revealing the firm’s choice between the compensating 
differential and efficiency wage approaches to worker compensation.  In section five, we explore 
this wage-working conditions relationship within the entire sample of foreign-exposed 
(exporting) firms.7  In section six, we examine how that wage-working conditions relationship 
differs by the dimension of foreign exposure for which our dataset contains variation – 
ownership.  Before we proceed with the empirical results, however, we will lay out a firm-level 
theoretical framework to illustrate the contrasting predictions of the compensating differential 
and efficiency wage models, and then describe the dataset used to evaluate these theoretical 
predictions.   
2. Conceptual Framework 
 To compare the predictions of the wage-working conditions relationship presented by the 
theories of compensating differentials and efficiency wages, we apply a basic isoquant 
production framework that is based on five assumptions.  First, firms respond rationally to an 
                                                 
7
 This component says nothing about the effect of foreign exposure, but examines firm behavior in selecting 
combinations of wages and working conditions within a unique dataset of foreign-exposed firms. 
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exogenously imposed positive shock to working conditions.8  Second, firms differentiate 
themselves according to output quality, as demonstrated specifically in exporting firms by 
Mandel (2008).  Third, firms can improve output quality by eliciting more effort from workers.  
Fourth, workers will put forth more effort if they receive greater compensation, which is 
comprised of combinations of wages and working conditions.  Finally, workers are willing to 
trade off wages and working conditions as inputs in their “production” of effort for the firm. 
 There are many combinations of wages and working conditions that a firm can offer to 
elicit each intended level of quality/effort from workers.  Because workers trade off wages and 
working conditions in their effort production function, wages and working conditions are 
negatively related within a given level of quality/effort.  A graphical depiction of the firm’s 
problem is illustrated in Figure 2a.  A firm aiming to elicit a low level of effort might operate 
anywhere on the Low Effort isoquant. One such firm, starting at some combination of wages and 
working conditions represented by point P, has two broad options for the path it takes in 
wages/working conditions space when an exogenous improvement in working conditions is 
imposed.  It can reduce wages in response to the higher costs of improving working conditions 
(move down along the Low Effort isoquant to point N) or it can hold wages constant or even 
increase them (move to the High Effort isoquant, to point M).  Moving along a given effort curve 
represents the wage-working conditions tradeoff, or the compensating differential relationship.  
A shift to a higher effort curve, meanwhile, illustrates the essence of efficiency wage theory: 
                                                 
8
 This theoretical analysis considers an exogenous improvement in working conditions as prompted by the Better 
Factories Cambodia program.  The conclusions would be the same if we considered an exogenous improvement in 
wages and its impact on working conditions, because this analysis considers the relationship between wage 
compliance and working conditions, not the causality therein.  In other words, for each improvement in either wages 
or working conditions made by the firm, this model considers the two possible effects (negative or nonnegative) on 
the other form of compensation. 
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increasing total worker compensation can be profit-maximizing for the firm when it produces 
greater worker effort.   
 As a result, the relationship between wages and working conditions within firms over 
time can reveal their choice between a compensating differentials approach (which holds worker 
welfare constant despite changing compensation mixes) and alternative approaches such as 
efficiency wages (which improve worker welfare).  The next section describes the data that we 
will use to explore this wage-working conditions relationship in Cambodian garment factories. 
3.  Data 
 In this section, we detail the data that we use to empirically examine the relationships 
between foreign ownership, wage compliance, and working conditions compliance.  First, we 
describe the source of the dataset, its contents, and the design of the program that supplied it.  
Next, we describe how we combine the numerous working conditions and wage compliance 
measures into a few comprehensive indicator variables for empirical analysis.  Finally, we 
provide summary statistics of the variables we use. 
3.1 Data Source 
 The data come from the Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) program of the International 
Labor Organization.  Designed to improve working conditions in Cambodian factories by 
addressing the problem of imperfect information between factories and buyers, this program 
aims to inform buyers about the conditions in the factories from which they purchase garments.  
To do so, BFC monitors working conditions in all Cambodian garment factories during 
unannounced visits, sending Cambodian monitors into factories to complete a survey assessing 
the factory’s compliance on a variety of working conditions and wage requirements. To avoid 
monitor bias, each monitoring team contains at least two people, and the same team rarely 
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assesses the same factory twice.  After the factory’s second BFC visit, BFC publishes the firm’s 
name and progress on improving working conditions in an annual synthesis report, which they 
share with the factories’ buyers. 
 As the Cambodian government has mandated that all exporting garment factories consent 
to this monitoring program, it eventually reached all such factories.  The original wave of visits 
in 2001-2002 reached 119 factories with the first survey created for BFC.  For the three years 
following the visits to these original factories, monitors conducted visits using less formal 
techniques and did not carefully record results, so data are unavailable for this three-year period.  
The next wave of documented visits began with the launch of the improved Information 
Management System (IMS) survey in December 2005.  Since then, monitors have visited each 
factory an average of once every eight months.  Through July 2008, this panel dataset contains 
363 factories and 1154 factory-visit observations, of which 289 factories have more than one 
visit and a known country of origin (for a total of 1060 observations). 
 The theoretical framework calls for variables representing wages, working conditions, 
and the standard determinants of wages within firms such as size, age, and ownership (Brown 
and Medoff 1989; Brown and Medoff 2003).  Because wages themselves are unavailable in the 
dataset, an index of five measures of compliance on wage law (explained below) will serve as a 
proxy for wages.  The dataset contains approximately 130 measures of working conditions, 
which we aggregate in different ways to represent working conditions empirically. Firm controls 
include firm age (in months), firm size (measured as the total number of workers) and the 
percentage of workers in a union, all of which should predict higher wage compliance.  We also 
control for the variation in the BFC effect using measures of the cumulative number of BFC 
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visits and their frequency.  Finally, specifications in section six will include a control for foreign 
ownership. 
3.2 Construction of Index Variables 
 The dataset includes approximately 130 compliance variables, all on a 0/1 compliance/ 
noncompliance scale.  The compliance questions from which these variables originate, matched 
between the original and IMS surveys, are listed in Appendix A. To make these useful for 
analysis, we group these variables into four broad working conditions categories (shown in Table 
3a) with several subcategories within each category.  We generate compliance rates for each 
category as the simple average of compliance across the questions in the category, normalized to 
a scale of 100.  Wages, for example, contains five compliance questions9, so a Wages value of 60 
means that the factory was compliant on three of the five wage payment questions during that 
visit.  We generate all other indices in the same way, though the rest contain more questions, 
ranging from 13 to 43 in the disaggregated working conditions measures.  The most complicated 
index is Working Conditions, which contains all of the other non-wage indices shown in Table 
3a, and is the measure of working conditions used in this paper unless specified otherwise. 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
The working conditions covered by the survey range from occupational safety and health 
(OSH) to freedom of association and collective bargaining (FACB) to maternity leave and other 
benefits.  The categories of working conditions and the summary statistics of their compliance 
rates, along with some basic firm characteristics and the breakdown of ownership groups, are 
shown in Table 3b. The average factory is almost five years old and employs about 1200 
workers.  Of the 363 factories, 278 have received at least two BFC visits and have complete data 
                                                 
9
 The five compliance variables included in the Wages index are whether the firm paid the proper minimum wage, 
overtime wage, night wage, holiday wage, and wage during weekly time off (Sunday). 
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for the necessary firm controls.  Visits typically fall about ten months apart, but the time between 
visits varies widely due to a gap in the dataset (explained below).  As shown in Table 3c, the vast 
majority of the sample (95%) is foreign-owned, with about 65% owned by Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and China; 22% owned by Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore; 3% owned by Western countries; 
and 2% owned by other Asian countries. 
The mean level of working conditions compliance in the sample was about 86%, meaning 
that the average factory visited between 2001 and 2008 was found to be noncompliant on about 
14% of measures.  The mean level of wage compliance is higher (92%), but it also varies more 
widely.  Rates of compliance on the smaller working conditions categories range from the 
relatively low 81% on OSH to the relatively high 91% for FACB.  
Finally, Table 3d illustrates the varying levels and changes of wage and working 
conditions compliance by different ownership groups and in different periods.  In general, 
compliance is fairly high and improving for most groups, with the exception of wage compliance 
in Cambodian firms. Malaysian firms tended to be the most compliant on both wages and 
working conditions, while Cambodian firms were the least compliant on these measures.  
Chinese firms improved working conditions at the fastest rate, while Other Asian firms improved 
wages at the fastest rate. Most interestingly, foreign-owned firms exhibited greater compliance 
on both wages and working conditions as well as greater improvement in compliance on wages 
than domestically owned firms.  These statistics give no indication of a compensating differential 
relationship between wages and working conditions, as the groups most compliant on wages are 
also the most compliant on working conditions.  We turn next to statistical analysis to further 
explore this question. 
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4.  Foreign Ownership’s Impact on Wages and Working Conditions 
 For a basic idea of one aspect of globalization’s effect on the welfare of workers in these 
garment factories, we first explore the impact of foreign ownership on wages and working 
conditions.  We begin by estimating Equation (1), shown below: 
Wagesit = ß0 + ß1(FirmSizeit)+ ß2(FirmAgeit) + ß3(%Unionit) + ß4(ForeignOwnershipit) + εit     (1) 
where t is measured in visits, i is the firm, Wages is an index variable as described above, Firm 
Size is the number of workers employed by the firm, Firm Age is measured in months, %Union 
is the percentage of workers in a union, and Foreign Ownership is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the firm is not Cambodian-owned.  The results, shown in the first column of Table 4a, 
indicate a relatively large and statistically significant (at the 10% level) effect of Foreign 
Ownership on wage compliance, with wage compliance about nine percentage points higher in 
foreign-owned firms than in domestically owned firms.  These results confirm findings 
elsewhere in the literature of higher wages in foreign-owned firms, so long as we assume wage 
compliance to be an effective proxy for wages. 
 These results might be biased by the fact that firms have differing numbers of 
observations.  If there is a systematic relationship between a factory’s number of visits, its 
ownership status, and its wage compliance, including multiple visit observations for each firm 
could bias our results in some way.  We therefore run a regression between firms, essentially 
evening out the number of observations per firm.  The result of this change, shown in column 
two of Table 4a, is very little change in the magnitude of the foreign ownership coefficient and a 
small increase in its statistical significance (which can be explained by the fact that the standard 
errors for between regressions cannot be corrected for heteroskedasticity).  Our results therefore 
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appear not to be biased by varying number of observations per firm, suggesting that foreign 
ownership does indeed have a positive effect on wage compliance. 
 The positive effect of foreign ownership on wage compliance does not, however, 
guarantee that workers in foreign-owned firms are better off than those in domestically owned 
firms.  We therefore also examine the effect of foreign ownership on the index of working 
conditions, running Equation (1) with Working Conditions (the aggregated index as described 
above) as the dependent variable.  The third column of Table 4a presents the results, which show 
a strong and statistically significant effect of foreign ownership on working conditions 
compliance.  While foreign ownership has a smaller effect on working conditions (about a four-
percentage-point increase) than on wages, the coefficient is still fairly large and statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  When we look at the foreign ownership on working conditions in a 
between-firms regression, the magnitude and significance of the coefficient both fall slightly, but 
the positive and statistically significant sign remains.  Since foreign ownership appears to have a 
strong and statistically significant impact on both wages and working conditions, these results 
suggest that higher wages (represented by greater wage compliance) in foreign-owned firms do 
not serve as compensating differentials for worse working conditions. 
 Because the detailed nature of our dataset allows us to explore further details of the 
foreign ownership relationship with wage compliance and working conditions, we disaggregate 
the foreign ownership variable into the eight countries/groups of countries shown in Table 3c and 
include indicator variables for each in place of the foreign ownership dummy in Eq. (1).  The 
results, shown in column one of Table 4b, reveal that the bulk of the foreign ownership 
coefficient results from the large and statistically significant positive coefficients on Korea, 
Malaysia, and Singapore.  Interestingly, when we run the between regression (column two of 
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Table 4b), we find that Hong Kong also carries a large and statistically significant coefficient, 
though the results change very little otherwise.  Clearly, the effect of foreign ownership on wage 
compliance is not universally identical; the source of the foreign ownership determines the 
magnitude and significance of its effect. 
 The same is true of the positive effect of foreign ownership on working conditions.  The 
results of the random effects regression, with Working Conditions as the dependent variable, 
reveal positive and statistically significant effects of all countries/groups but China and Other 
Asia. Looking at the between effects results (column four of Table 4b), we see that West and 
Singapore lose their statistical significance, and the significant country coefficients again fall in 
magnitude, but the positive and statistically significant effect remains.  These results confirm that 
the country of origin impacts the magnitude and significance of the foreign ownership effect.  
While the specific country of ownership matters, disaggregating the foreign ownership variable 
does allow us to see that the positive Foreign Ownership coefficient is no fluke; foreign 
ownership does appear to improve working conditions and wage compliance relative to 
Cambodian ownership. 
5.  Wages and Working Conditions Within Firms Over Time 
 The positive effect of foreign ownership on wages and working conditions separately 
says little about how firms choose combinations of wages and working conditions, but this firm 
choice is vital to workers’ welfare outcomes.  Understanding the impact of changing working 
conditions on wage compliance within firms, especially in response to an exogenous shock like 
the implementation of Better Factories Cambodia, can help reveal whether such programs have a 
net positive impact on workers.  We therefore now consider the relationship between wages and 
working conditions within firms over time in the full sample of exporting garment factories.  
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5.1 Estimation Issues 
 While the small number of time periods mitigates the risk of serial correlation or 
nonstationarity, the wide diversity of the firms makes heteroskedasticity likely. Results of a 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test confirm this suspicion. The empirical results that follow 
report heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors to address this issue.  In addition, 
multicollinearity could be a concern.  Diagnostic analysis suggests only mild multicollinearity, 10 
so we will proceed, acknowledging that there are some moderate correlations between 
explanatory variables, especially when we disaggregate working conditions.   
 Finally, the potentially simultaneous determination of wages and working conditions 
means that OLS estimation could yield biased coefficients in a standard statistical analysis, since 
the simultaneity leads to a correlation between the Working Conditions variable and the error 
term.  In a typical analysis aiming to assess a causal relationship between a dependent and 
independent variable, this simultaneity would bias the regression results and undermine their 
validity.  In our case, however, we aim to make no statements about the causal relationship 
between working conditions and wage compliance.  We instead aim to analyze the firms’ 
simultaneous decisions of wage-working conditions combinations.  Whether wage compliance 
affects working conditions or vice versa, the sign of the coefficient tells us whether firms 
improve or worsen their compliance on one when they improve on the other.  It is the sign of this 
relationship, no matter the direction of the causal arrow, in which we are interested.  Because our 
interpretation of the coefficients differs in this way from the typical analysis, our conclusions are 
not biased by the simultaneous determination of working conditions and wage compliance. 
5.2 Initial Results 
                                                 
10
 Among the simple correlation coefficients between categories, no coefficient exceeds 0.6, though one exceeds 
0.5.  The remainder of the correlation coefficients are less than 0.25.  A test of the Variance Inflation Factors 
indicates only mild multicollinearity, with a maximum VIF of 1.6. 
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 The compensating differential literature guides us with two analytical techniques for 
evaluating the wage-working conditions relationship.  The first method we explore includes 
dependent and independent variables in the current period, with fixed effects to absorb any firm-
based variations in productivity or other omitted controls. We begin by estimating Equation (2) 
below, where t is measured in visits, i is the factory, Wages and Working Conditions are indices 
as described above, Firm Size is in hundreds of workers, Firm Age is in years, %Union is the 
percentage of workers in a union, Visit is the number of visits completed (including the t’th 
visit), and Time is the number of months since the last BFC visit to the factory. 
Wagesit = ß0 + ß1(Working Conditionsit) + ß2(Firm Sizeit) + ß3(Firm Ageit) + ß4(%Unionit) + 
ß5(Visitit) + ß6(Timeit) +  εit  (2) 
 The results, shown in column one of Table 5a, are a surprising contradiction to 
compensating differential theory but correspond well with the results of Section 4.  While none 
of the controls is statistically significant, most are correctly signed, and the Working Conditions 
coefficient is positive, relatively large, and statistically significant at the one percent level.  The 
coefficient of 0.783 indicates that, for each ten percent improvement in working conditions 
compliance, wage compliance increases almost eight percent. This pattern emerges despite our 
controls for the firm age, firm size, unionization in the firm, number of BFC visits to the factory, 
and amount of time since the last BFC visit.  Explanatory power of the regression is low, 
however, with an overall R-squared of only 0.08, and the controls are all statistically 
insignificant when we use heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.  Nonetheless, these 
results indicate that, controlling for the theoretically essential firm characteristics, working 
conditions and wage compliance are positively related.   
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These results, however, fail to capture the main advantage of the fixed effects method 
relative to the difference-in-difference method; using fixed effects allows us to consider a larger 
sample size because we can include the first visit in the time series.  In this particular 
specification, however, the Time variable is measured as the time between visits, thereby 
excluding the first observation for each firm from the regression.  Given the statistical 
insignificance of the Time control, its exclusion seems warranted to enable a broader 
examination of the relationship.  Excluding this variable, the results of which are shown in 
column two of Table 5a, increases the sample size by over fifty percent.  The results are quite 
similar to those of column one, with a slight increase in the magnitude of the coefficient but no 
change in its significance.  These results indicate a strong and relatively large positive 
relationship between wages and working conditions in these firms, regardless of whether we use 
a specification that captures the full sample. 
 The other analytical method most frequently used to identify compensating differentials 
is the difference-in-difference approach.  Because this method has generally been more effective 
in identifying compensating differential relationships, and because the two levels regressions 
suggest no major change in results when using the larger sample size, the rest of our analysis will 
employ the difference-in-difference approach. 11  This regression equation, shown below, 
explores the relationship between the change in wage compliance and the change in working 
conditions compliance. 
∆Wagesi(t-[t-1]) = ß0 + ß1(∆Working Conditions i(t-[t-1])) + ß2(∆Firm Size i(t-[t-1])) + ß3(Firm Ageit) + 
ß4(∆%Union i(t-[t-1])) + ß5(Visitit) + ß6(∆Time i(t-[t-1])) +  εit  (2a) 
                                                 
11
 The difference-in-difference approach allows us to examine changes within firms over time, holding constant any 
firm-specific variation unobserved in other control variables. This approach is commonly used in the compensating 
differential literature to control for productivity variation among units of observation (in our case the firm; in most 
cases the worker), and appears to be the only empirical method to consistently illustrate the theoretically predicted 
compensating differential relationship. 
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 Regression results for Equation (2a), shown in the third column of Table 5a, illustrate a 
fairly strong positive relationship between working conditions and wage compliance in these 
firms.  The statistically significant coefficient of 0.869 indicates that, when the change in 
working conditions compliance improves by ten percentage points, the change in wage 
compliance improves by nearly nine percentage points.12  In other words, improving working 
conditions translates almost one-for-one into improving wage compliance.  
 These results contradict the contention of compensating differential theory that wages 
and working conditions should move opposite one another within firms.  The observed positive 
relationship between working conditions and wage compliance implies that these firms can 
improve their outcomes by increasing their total compensation mix to workers (moving from the 
Low Effort to the High Effort isoquant); if this were not the case, the firm’s rational behavior 
would lead to a negative relationship between wages and working conditions.  It appears, 
therefore, that the efficiency wage model, which predicts simultaneous improvements in wages 
and working conditions (presumably) to inspire greater worker effort, captures the behavior of 
these exporting firms better than the compensating differentials model.  While we cannot 
contrast these results with those of non-exporting firms, we can say that, within this sample of 
foreign-exposed firms, higher wage compliance does not signal worse working conditions or 
vice versa. 
5.3 Robustness 
 To evaluate the robustness of the large and significant working conditions coefficient, we 
use a variety of alternative specifications and sample alterations, the results of which we will 
discuss in this subsection.  First of all, given the subjective nature of the data collection and the 
                                                 
12
 Recall that both wages and working conditions are measured in indices of compliance, generated in such a way 
that a one-unit increase amounts to a one percentage point improvement in compliance. 
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discrete (0/1) nature of the compliance measures, the data could contain monitor-based variation 
as different monitors draw different lines between compliance and noncompliance.  We therefore 
include a set of monitor dummy variables, equal to one if the monitor was present in the factory 
for that visit.  The results of including this set of dummy variables are shown in column four of 
Table 5a.  The dummy variables’ coefficients (not shown) are all statistically insignificant, and 
the main effect of their inclusion is to increase the magnitude of the (still statistically 
insignificant) Visit variable.  The coefficient on Working Conditions increases slightly, and 
remains statistically significant at the 1% level.  The variation in monitors in the sample appears 
not to affect the strong wages-working conditions relationship. 
 While unionization is a theoretically essential determinant of wage compliance, the data 
used to generate the unionization variable are imperfect, and including this variable reduces the 
sample by 160 observations.  We therefore test whether these data imperfections or sample 
limitations are somehow driving the strong relationship between wage compliance and working 
conditions.  Column five of Table 5a shows the results of Equation (2a) with unionization 
excluded.  The Working Conditions coefficient falls slightly, to 0.802, in response to this change, 
but remains relatively large and statistically significant at the 1% level.  Excluding each of the 
other firm-level controls individually (not shown) has even less of an effect on the Working 
Conditions coefficient and the other coefficients in the regression.13 
 It is also possible that wage compliance and working conditions move together simply 
because both have improved over time, due to increasing standards globally and especially due 
to the effect of BFC’s presence.  Though we control for the variation in the BFC effect using the 
number of visits and the time since the last visit, the global improvement over time may only be 
                                                 
13
 Excluding Firm Size had the largest effect among these, reducing the Working Conditions coefficient to 0.85 (still 
statistically significant at 1%) and having almost no effect on the other coefficients. 
 20 
captured in a continuous time variable.  We therefore include Time in the next specification, the 
results of which are shown in column six of Table 5a.  The coefficient on the Time variable is 
positive but statistically insignificant, and its inclusion actually slightly increases the Working 
Conditions coefficient.  Wage compliance and working conditions may be improving together 
over time, but taking out the time effect does not reduce the strength of the wage-working 
conditions relationship. 
 Given the large gap in the dataset (explained briefly in section 3.1), we suspect that there 
may be differences between the firms present in the first wave of visits in 2001-2002 and the 
firms that entered the program when the new “IMS” system was launched in late 2005.  Columns 
one and two of Table 5b therefore estimate Equation (2a) separately for these two groups of 
firms. While the Working Conditions coefficient remains virtually unchanged, these two columns 
reveal some interesting differences between these two groups of firms.  The effect of the amount 
of time between visits is zero in the original firms, but negative and statistically significant (as 
expected) among the IMS firms.14  The number of visits has the expected positive effect among 
the original firms, but its coefficient is relatively large, negative, and statistically significant for 
the IMS firms. 15 Surprisingly, given these other differences between the two groups, the 
Working Conditions coefficient is almost the same for each sample as for the sample as a whole.  
Combining these two groups appears not to mask any hidden negative relationship between wage 
compliance and working conditions. 
                                                 
14
 This difference is likely driven by the large gap in the dataset, which affects the time between visits one and two 
for the original firms but not for the IMS firms. 
15
 This contrast suggests a potentially nonlinear relationship between visits and wage compliance over time, since 
the original factories are earlier in the sample, but adding a visits-squared term (results not shown) yielded 
statistically insignificant coefficients on the Visit variables and had no effect on the Working Conditions coefficient. 
It seems that, despite the differences between these two groups of factories, the specification for the sample as a 
whole does not improve with changes to the way the Visit variable is specified.   We also generated a dummy 
variable equal to one if the factory was one of the original factories, included that in the whole-sample regression, 
and also included that dummy interacted with the Visit variable.  The Working Conditions coefficient was 
unaffected, and the other variables’ coefficients were statistically insignificant. 
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 Examining the full sample could also mask differing cultures of compliance in more 
compliant firms, leading to differing wage-working conditions relationships.  In other words, 
some firms, possibly those under certain ownership or with greater exposure to working 
conditions enforcement officials, might simply be more compliant as a whole, thereby biasing 
our results in favor of a stronger positive wage-working conditions relationship.  We therefore 
split the sample, roughly in half, by each firm’s average level of compliance over its lifetime in 
the sample.  Results of Equation (2a) for the more compliant firms (greater than 85% average 
compliance over all of the firm’s visits for all compliance points, both wages and working 
conditions) are shown in column three of Table 5b.  Interestingly, the results are opposite what 
we expected; while a culture of compliance would lead to a larger positive relationship in more 
compliant firms, we observe a smaller positive relationship in higher-compliance firms. This 
result may be attributable to the closed nature of the compliance score (the fact that maximum 
compliance of 100% is attainable).  Since 86% of the high-compliance firms have reached 100% 
wage compliance, improvements in working conditions compliance in these firms can be 
associated at best with no change in wage compliance, leading to a smaller (but still positive and 
statistically significant) relationship between wages and working conditions in these firms, with 
a coefficient magnitude about half as large as in the entire sample.   
 Isolating the lower-compliance firms, meanwhile, allows us to observe the larger positive 
wage-working conditions relationship in these factories.  The size of the firm and the degree of 
unionization also become statistically significant positive predictors of greater wage compliance 
in these lower-compliance firms.  The contrasting wage-working conditions relationships 
between high- and low-compliance factories is robust to the compliance percentage at which we 
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split the sample, consistently yielding a Working Conditions coefficient of around 0.4 for high-
compliance firms and 1.0 - 1.4 for low-compliance firms.16  
 It is also illustrative to split the sample by the compliance level of the observation rather 
than averaged over the life of the firm.  As shown in the previous set of results, when we divide 
the sample by the firms’ average level of compliance over their lifetimes, more compliant firms 
tend to exhibit smaller positive wage-working conditions relationships.  If this is indeed due to 
their inability to improve wages beyond 100% compliance, we should observe the same pattern 
when we sort the sample by overall compliance in each firm-visit observation and divide the 
sample according to this measure.  Interestingly, while 93% of the high-compliance 
observations17 in this sample have reached 100% wage compliance, the high-compliance 
sample’s Working Conditions coefficient is roughly the same magnitude as (and, in fact, slightly 
larger than) that of the low-compliance sample.  These results, shown in columns five and six of 
Table 5b, also contain similarly insignificant coefficients on control variables.  Splitting the 
sample by overall compliance at the observation level thus yields different results than when we 
split by compliance at the firm level, but no sample exhibits the expected negative wage-working 
conditions relationship that compensating differential theory predicts.  We’ve therefore presented 
some food for thought, but have yet to find any evidence supporting compensating differential 
theory. 
5.4 Disaggregated Working Conditions 
 The aggregated Working Conditions variable, generated as an index of 130 different 
individual measures of working conditions, conceals a lot of variation among different types of 
working conditions.  Another interesting test of the results’ robustness, therefore, is to 
                                                 
16
 We split the sample at 83% and 87% average compliance to find these results.  Splitting at higher or lower 
averages resulted in samples too small to effectively interpret results. 
17
 (where high-compliance is greater than 87% overall compliance on wages and working conditions combined) 
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disaggregate the Working Conditions variable into four broad categories (those shown in Table 
3a).  Replacing the aggregated Working Conditions variable in Equation (2) with these four 
disaggregated variables yields Equation (3) below, the results for which are shown in column 
one of Table 5b.  
∆Wages
 i(t-[t-1]) = ß0 + ß1(∆OSH i(t-[t-1])) + ß2(∆Paperwork i(t-[t-1])) + ß3(∆FACB i(t-[t-1])) + 
ß4(∆Internal Relations/Benefits i(t-[t-1])) + ß5(∆Firm Size i(t-[t-1])) + ß6(Firm Ageit) +  
ß7(∆%Union i(t-[t-1])) + ß8(Visitit) + ß9(∆Time i(t-[t-1])) +  εit  (3) 
 With the disaggregated working conditions variables, the control variables remain 
generally insignificant and of the same signs as in the previous specifications, and explanatory 
power remains low, with an R-squared value of 0.09.  Three of the four working conditions 
variables are statistically significant, two of them at the 1% level.  Paperwork, the index of 
worker information, documentation, and communication with the Cambodian Labor Ministry, 
carries a relatively large and statistically significant coefficient, an unsurprising result given that 
compliance improvements in this category are relatively low cost and therefore less likely to be 
traded off with wage compliance.  Controlling for the level of unionization, Freedom of 
Association and Collective Bargaining (FACB) carries a positive coefficient that is significant 
only at the 10% level.  In other words, even when we control for the positive effect of 
unionization on wages, we still observe a positive relationship between other measures of FACB 
and wage compliance.  In addition, our index of Internal Relations and Benefits carries the 
largest positive coefficient, also significant at the 1% level, despite the fact that this category 
contains some of the measures most likely to be traded off with wages (benefits).   
 In contrast, the OSH (Occupational Safety and Health) coefficient is positive but 
insignificant, suggesting that, if firms are trading off any form of working conditions with wage 
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compliance, this category may represent them.  Nonetheless, because this category’s 
insignificance differs so strongly from the results found earlier in this section, we explore OSH in 
greater depth.  Column two of Table 5c shows regression results for Equation (3), with the 
smaller subcategory components of OSH substituted in for the broader category variable.  The 
results, a list of insignificant coefficients hovering around zero, fail to reveal any hidden 
relationships within OSH, instead confirming the lack of a significant relationship between wage 
compliance and OSH.   
 While the disaggregation of OSH failed to turn up any hidden relationships, it might be 
that the disaggregation itself was the problem.  Empirically, multicollinearity could be the issue, 
and theoretically, such relationships may only emerge with more aggregate variables because of 
a firm’s holistic approach to choosing a package of working conditions to offer.  For this reason, 
and to provide more a more detailed analysis of the other categories, we disaggregate FACB and 
Internal Relations and Benefits.  When we split FACB, we find that two of the three 
subcategories (Unions and Strikes) carry statistically significant positive coefficients, while the 
third (Shop Stewards) is insignificant.  These results give no indication of a multicollinearity 
issue caused by disaggregation. 
 To divide Internal Relations and Benefits, we first split it into Benefits and Internal 
Relations, with the results shown in column four of Table 5b.  Even this relatively small change 
in specification is revealing, as the Benefits coefficient is statistically insignificant, consistent 
with the expectation that firms would be more likely to trade off benefits and wages.  The 
Internal Relations coefficient remains relatively large and statistically significant.  To provide an 
even more detailed picture and to further test the multicollinearity question, we further 
disaggregate both Benefits and Internal Relations in columns five and six (respectively) of Table 
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5b.  Disaggregation of Benefits yields no coefficients that statistically differ from zero, consistent 
with the Benefits coefficient as a whole.  Disaggregation of Internal Relations, meanwhile, 
reveals that Core Standards and Working Time are statistically significantly related to wages.  
Furthermore, it appears that Core Standards is largely responsible for the magnitude of the 
Internal Relations aggregated coefficient, though Working Time appears to play an important 
role in its significance.  The statistical significance of these results does indicate that 
multicollinearity plays at most a minimal role, suggesting that the insignificance of OSH in 
predicting wage compliance may reflect a true zero relationship between the two.  A zero 
relationship is still non-negative, though, so we continue to fail to find evidence supporting 
compensating differential theory within these foreign-exposed firms. 
6.  Foreign Ownership and the Wage-Working Conditions Relationship  
6.1 Initial Results 
 To determine how wage compliance and working conditions are differently related in 
foreign-owned firms than in domestically owned ones, we add a foreign ownership dummy 
variable and that dummy interacted with Working Conditions (WC) to Equation (2a) to get 
Equation (4) below: 
∆Wages
 i(t-[t-1])= ß0 + ß1(∆WC i(t-[t-1]))+ ß2(∆FirmSize i(t-[t-1]))+ ß3(FirmAgeit)+ ß4(∆%Union i(t-[t-1])) 
+ ß5(Visitit)+ ß6(∆Time i(t-[t-1]))+ ß7(Foreign-Ownedit)+ ß8(Foreign-Ownedit*∆WC i(t-[t-1]))+ εit   (4) 
 With this specification, the coefficient on the Working Conditions variable represents the 
relationship between wage compliance and working conditions in domestically owned firms, 
while the interaction term’s coefficient represents the marginal impact of foreign ownership on 
that relationship.  Adding ß1 and ß8, therefore, gives the total impact of working conditions on 
wage compliance in foreign-owned firms.  Initial results for Equation (4), shown in the first 
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column of Table 6a, look very similar to those in Table 5a.  R-squared remains low at 0.10, and 
most controls’ coefficients remain statistically insignificant and small.  Interestingly, the 
Working Conditions variable maintains a positive and statistically significant coefficient, and its 
magnitude nearly triples, indicating that the positive relationship between wage compliance and 
working conditions is stronger in the domestically owned firms than in the sample as a whole.  In 
these domestically owned firms, when Working Conditions improve by ten percentage points, 
wage compliance improves by about 24 percentage points, a very large effect.   
 The negative coefficient on the Foreign Ownership x Working Conditions interaction 
term, meanwhile, suggests that marginal impact of foreign ownership on the wage-working 
conditions relationship is negative.  The total effect of working conditions on wage compliance 
in foreign-owned firms is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, but the effect is 
much smaller (an 8-percentage-point increase in wage compliance for a 10-percentage-point 
improvement in working conditions) than that in domestically owned firms.  Given that 
compliance on both wages and working conditions is higher in foreign-owned firms, the smaller 
positive relationship in these firms is unsurprising; beyond some high level of compliance, 
additional improvements in wage and/or working conditions compliance become less feasible 
and the marginal effort returns on these improvements may diminish. 
6.2 Robustness 
 Columns two through six of Table 6a show results for a variety of different specifications 
and sample changes, most of which are identical to those reported in section five.  As before, the 
Working Conditions coefficient changes little with the varying specifications, and the Foreign 
Ownership and interaction coefficients generally remain fairly stable as well.  Columns three and 
four of Table 6a show results with unionization excluded and a time variable added, respectively. 
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The pattern of positive wage-working conditions relationships in all firms (but a stronger effect 
of working conditions on wage compliance in domestically owned firms) remains through these 
specification changes. 
 The positive relationship also remains when we control for the monitors that visited the 
factory (column two of Table 6a), but the marginal negative effect of foreign ownership becomes 
statistically insignificant in this specification.  These results correspond interestingly with the 
results shown in columns five and six of Table 6a, in which we split the sample into the original 
and IMS firms.  In the IMS firms, the statistical significance of the foreign ownership impact on 
the wage-working conditions relationship disappears, but the impact of foreign ownership is 
much stronger in the original firms.  Because there was incomplete overlap in monitors between 
the two time periods, some monitors are present only for the first set of visits to the original 
firms, so the monitor controls in the results presented in column two of Table 6a could be 
capturing the same effect as the contrast between columns five and six – a distinct marginal 
effect of foreign ownership between these two samples.  These results continue to confirm the 
positive wage-working conditions relationship in both domestically and foreign-owned firms, but 
present a potential caveat to the conclusion that foreign ownership reduces the strength of the 
wage-working conditions relationship in these firms. 
6.3 Disaggregated Working Conditions and Foreign Ownership 
 The results presented in Table 6a focus on working conditions and Foreign Ownership 
variables that are both aggregated for simplicity, but given the detailed data we have available, 
we can also disaggregate these variables into their components.  First, as shown in section 5.4, 
we can disaggregate the Working Conditions variable into four groups of working conditions.  
Replacing the Working Conditions variable with these four smaller variables and interacting each 
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of these smaller variables with Foreign Ownership yields the results shown in Table 6b.  The 
results serve to clarify somewhat the difference between the wage-working conditions 
relationship in domestically owned firms (the stand-alone working conditions coefficients in the 
first column) and the relationship in foreign-owned firms (the total effect coefficients in the third 
column).   In domestically owned firms, Paperwork and Internal Relations and Benefits are 
significantly positively related to wage compliance, while we find some evidence of 
compensating differentials in the statistically significant negative coefficient on FACB (Freedom 
of Association and Collective Bargaining).  In foreign-owned firms, we find no evidence of 
compensating differentials, but we find weak positive relationships of wage compliance with 
Paperwork and FACB.  Consistent with the results with the aggregated Working Conditions 
variable, we generally find foreign ownership to weaken but not eliminate the positive effect 
between wage compliance and working conditions. 
 The differing effect of FACB in the two groups is an interesting exception to this general 
finding, especially because it is the only working conditions measure for which we find 
statistically significant evidence of a compensating differential relationship.  Surprisingly, given 
the consistently weaker positive wage-working conditions relationship in foreign-owned firms, 
we find this isolated evidence of compensating differentials in domestically owned firms. In this 
case, foreign ownership has a large positive impact on the wage-working conditions relationship, 
an impact large enough to produce a total working conditions effect that is statistically 
significant and positive.  This interesting result certainly warrants further exploration of the 
relationship between Freedom of Association/Collective Bargaining and wages, but we will 
leave this task for future research. 
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 The impact of foreign ownership on wage compliance might vary by the source country 
in addition to varying by the category of working conditions considered. The results in Table 6c 
explore this possibility by including a set of country of ownership dummies (using the countries 
and groups shown in Table 3c) and their interactions with Working Conditions.  As before, 
working conditions (measured again as the aggregate Working Conditions variable) are 
significantly positively related to wage compliance in domestically owned firms. The interaction 
terms are all negative and most are statistically significant (with the exceptions of China and 
Other Asia), affirming the general result that foreign-owned firms exhibit a smaller positive 
wage-working conditions relationship than domestically owned firms.  Furthermore, the 
disaggregated ownership variables reveal that, in some cases, the wage-working conditions 
relationship is statistically indistinct from zero.  In no case, however, do we observe a 
statistically significant negative relationship between wage compliance and working conditions.  
The broad overview of these results thus provides further evidence of a non-negative relationship 
between wages and working conditions, while confirming this relationship’s statistically 
significant variation between domestically and foreign-owned firms. 
While the results generally support the findings of Section 6.1, the variation in the 
interaction term coefficients illustrates that the effect of foreign ownership on the wage-working 
conditions relationship differs by the source country.  Firms from the West, Korea, Malaysia, and 
Singapore all have a statistically significantly (5% level) smaller positive relationship between 
wage compliance and working conditions, relative to Cambodian firms.  In contrast to the 
aggregated foreign ownership results, the interaction effects yield a total wage-working 
conditions relationship that is not statistically significantly positive in these firms. Though the 
disaggregated interaction terms do not reveal any powerful hidden evidence of compensating 
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differentials, these results do show that firms in these countries exhibit no relationship at all 
between wage compliance and working conditions. 
Meanwhile, firms from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the other Asian country group 
held a positive and statistically significant relationship between wage compliance and working 
conditions, consistent with the results found with the aggregated foreign ownership variable.18  
These results indicate a greater similarity in patterns of compliance between Cambodian firms 
and those affiliated with China (firms from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) than between 
Cambodian firms and the rest of the firms.  These varying relationships are fascinating and 
should be the topic of more in-depth future research.  Our fundamental point, however, remains 
that only for one country and one measure of working conditions measure do we see any 
evidence of compensating differentials.  In the vast majority of scenarios, working conditions 
and wage compliance are positive related in all firms, but more so in domestically owned firms. 
7. Conclusion 
  We have shown, first of all, that compliance on both wages and working conditions is 
higher in foreign-owned firms, contradicting the compensating differentials explanation for 
foreign ownership wage premiums.  Furthermore, in this sample of Cambodian exporting 
garment factories as a whole, wage compliance and working conditions are positively related, 
supporting an efficiency wages explanation of why some firms pay higher wages than others and 
indicating that workers are made better off overall by working in firms that pay them higher 
wages.  This positive wage-working conditions relationship, while smaller in foreign-owned 
firms as a whole, also suggests that both domestically and foreign-owned firms in this sample 
                                                 
18
 This positive overall relationship emerges in Hong Kong and Taiwan despite a statistically significantly (10% 
level) smaller positive relationship in these countries’ firms relative to Cambodian firms.  In other words, while they 
maintain a positive and statistically significant overall relationship between wage compliance and working 
conditions, the relationship is statistically significantly smaller in these firms than in Cambodian firms. 
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have responded to a positive working conditions shock by increasing the worker compensation 
package overall, thereby shifting their effort curves out.  This finding implies that programs like 
Better Factories Cambodia can push for improvements in working conditions without inducing a 
reduction in wage compliance, so such programs might increase overall worker welfare. 
 We present these results with reservation, however, due to some fundamental weaknesses 
in our dataset and results.  First and most importantly, the sample size of domestically owned 
firms is quite small relative to foreign-owned firms.  Due to this small sample size, our results 
may not be generally applicable for Cambodian firms, let alone firms in any other country.  In 
addition, our sample contains no firms that change ownership from domestic to foreign or vice 
versa during the sampling period.  As a result, we must rely on a between-firms assessment of 
the foreign ownership effect, preventing us from taking a true ceteris paribus look at the foreign 
ownership effect on the wage-working conditions relationship.  Finally, our empirical results are 
characterized by low r-squared values that indicate a failure to effectively predict wage 
compliance using our control variables.  Undoubtedly, the ideal regression would contain 
additional control variables to improve the explanatory power of the independent variables, but 
we face a less-than-ideal (though uniquely comprehensive) dataset.  In essence, we analyze a 
limited sample of domestic firms, with no within-firm variation in ownership, and explain only 
about 10% of the variation in wage compliance using our explanatory variables.  With that said, 
we also acknowledge that our results are robust to a range of specification alterations aimed at 
correcting or at least exposing these weaknesses.   
 This body of research, furthermore, is by no means complete.  We present only a single-
sector, single-country, single-dimension case study of globalization’s effect on the wage-working 
conditions relationship.  As the ILO’s Better Work program extends the Better Factories 
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Cambodia model to other developing countries, further research can address this question on a 
multi-country scale across sectors and including non-exporting firms for broader applicability of 
results.  The BFC dataset itself also contains the potential for further research to expand our 
understanding of the wage-working conditions relationship.  First of all, the interesting findings 
above of differing wage-working conditions relationships between working conditions measures 
and source countries provides an excellent opportunity for additional understanding of this 
complex issue.  Meanwhile, while our categorizations of working conditions make sense in the 
way they affect workers, they may not accurately reflect the cost analysis in the firm (for 
example, Occupational Safety and Health measures are grouped together but the costs of 
improving these measures can vary widely).  Alternate categorizations of the working conditions 
measures might therefore give a clearer picture of the wage-working conditions relationship and 
how it varies among different measures.  Finally, assessing the pair-wise relationships between a 
variety of different working conditions measures with one another could also reveal more about 
how firms make decisions in their provision of working conditions for workers.  While this sort 
of analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is well within the means of this rich dataset.  
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Table 3a: Contents of Aggregated Working Conditions 
Variables  
Wages (5)  
Minimum Wage; Premium Wages for Night Work, 
Overtime, Holiday Work, and Work on Weekly Time Off 
Working 
Conditions (127)  
OSH, Internal Relations and Benefits, Paperwork, FACB 
(see below) 
OSH (43)  
Occupational Health and Safety: Health Facilities; Water and 
Toilet; Temperature, Ventilation, Noise, and Lighting; 
Machine Safety; Safety of Operations and Workplace 
Motion; Emergency Preparedness; Chemical Safety 
Internal 
Relations 
(23) 
Child Labor, Discrimination, Forced Labor, 
Discipline/Management Conduct, Overtime, Regular Hours, 
Weekly Rest, Liaison Officers, Internal Disputes 
Internal 
Relations and 
Benefits (38) 
 
 
Benefits 
(15) 
Holiday, Annual, and Special Leave; Worker's 
Compensation; Maternity Leave and Benefits 
Paperwork (33)  
Informing Workers about Wages/Holidays/Working Time, 
Internal Regulations, Contracts/Hiring Procedures, 
Collective Agreements, MOSALVY (Cambodian Labor 
Ministry) Reporting/Permissions, Chemical Documentation, 
Health and Safety Assessment and Reporting 
FACB (13)  
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: Unions, 
Strikes, Shop Stewards 
Notes: Number of questions contained in the index shown in parentheses.  Listed contents of Wages variable are all 
individual questions, while listed contents of all other variables are groups of questions. 
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Table 3b: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs 
Mean/
% 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Firm Age (Years) 614 4.79 2.56 0.58 14.08 
D. Firm Age 614 0.84 0.86 0.08 5.08 
Firm Size (100s of Workers) 614 12.06 11.13 0.16 75.12 
∆ Firm Size 614 0.41 3.00 -13.51 30.52 
% Union (% Workers) 614 40.22 32.26 0.00 136.16 
∆ % Union 614 4.93 24.56 -102.55 102.32 
Visit (#) 614 3.07 0.96 2.00 6.00 
Time Difference (Days) 614 10.26 10.48 0.70 62.57 
      
Wage Compliance (%) 614 91.82 18.25 0.00 100.00 
∆ Wage Compliance 614 2.28 16.59 -80.00 80.00 
Working Conditions Compliance (%) 614 85.69 6.50 62.99 97.64 
∆ Working Conditions 614 1.76 4.91 -14.17 35.43 
      
Paperwork Compliance (%) 614 87.05 8.81 54.55 100.00 
∆ Paperwork Compliance 614 2.36 6.63 -24.24 30.30 
FACB Compliance (%) 614 90.54 7.25 53.85 100.00 
∆ FACB Compliance 614 1.23 8.71 -23.08 46.15 
IR/Benefits Compliance 614 87.66 6.50 63.16 100.00 
∆ IR/Benefits Compliance 614 1.64 6.11 -18.42 23.68 
OSH Compliance (%) 614 81.44 9.96 37.21 100.00 
∆ OSH Compliance 614 1.57 7.53 -25.58 62.79 
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Table 3c: Countries of Ownership 
Country 
Entire 
Sample 
% of Entire 
Sample 
Firms with 
2+ Visits 
% of Firms 
with 2+ Visits 
    
  
    
Taiwan 87 24.6% 76 26.3% 
    
  
  
  
Hong Kong SAR 76 21.5% 57 19.7% 
    
  
  
  
China 70 19.8% 55 19.0% 
China 69 
  
54 
  
Macau SAR 1 
  
1 
  
    
  
  
  
Korea 40 11.3% 33 11.4% 
          
Malaysia 19 5.4% 19 6.6% 
          
Singapore 15 4.2% 13 4.5% 
          
West 14 4.0% 10 3.5% 
American Samoa 1 
  
1   
Australia 4 
  
2   
Canada 1 
  
1   
France 1 
  
0   
Germany 1 
  
0   
United Kingdom 2 
  
2   
United States 4 
  
4   
    
  
    
Other Asia 6 1.7% 6 2.1% 
Bangladesh 1 
  
1   
Indonesia 2 
  
2   
Philippines 1 
  
1   
Thailand 1 
  
1   
Viet Nam 1 
  
1   
    
  
    
Cambodia 27 7.6% 20 6.9% 
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Table 3d: Wage and Working Conditions Compliance by FDI  
Variable Obs 
Mean 
(All 
Visits) 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Mean 
(Visit 
1) 
Mean 
(Visits 
4-5) 
Wage Compliance (%) 614 91.82 18.25 0.00 100.00 88.49 95.12 
Wage Compliance in Foreign-Owned (%) 582 90.00 19.13 0.00 100.00 84.75 95.13 
Wage Compliance in West-Owned (%) 17 91.76 14.25 60.00 100.00 87.50 100.00 
Wage Compliance in China-Owned (%) 114 84.04 24.41 0.00 100.00 74.63 93.75 
Wage Compliance in Hong Kong-Owned (%) 113 91.86 18.05 20.00 100.00 85.14 96.82 
Wage Compliance in Singapore-Owned (%) 27 93.33 17.54 20.00 100.00 88.89 97.78 
Wage Compliance in Taiwan-Owned (%) 182 90.33 18.17 0.00 100.00 88.85 93.13 
Wage Compliance in Korea-Owned (%) 70 90.57 18.25 20.00 100.00 85.38 95.45 
Wage Compliance in Malaysia-Owned (%) 45 95.56 10.35 60.00 100.00 92.31 97.78 
Wage Compliance in Other Asia-Owned (%) 14 90.00 17.10 40.00 100.00 80.00 96.00 
Wage Compliance in Domestically Owned (%) 32 81.25 30.87 0.00 100.00 78.57 85.00 
         
∆ Wage Compliance 614 2.28 16.59 -80.00 80.00 4.15 0.39 
∆Wage Compliance in Foreign-Owned (%) 582 2.44 15.92 -80.00 80.00 4.75 0.41 
∆Wage Compliance in West-Owned (%) 17 2.35 6.64 0.00 20.00 2.50 0.00 
∆Wage Compliance in China-Owned (%) 114 4.91 20.71 -80.00 80.00 9.76 -2.50 
∆Wage Compliance in Hong Kong-Owned (%) 113 1.59 16.51 -60.00 60.00 4.57 -0.45 
∆Wage Compliance in Singapore-Owned (%) 27 0.74 8.74 -20.00 40.00 4.44 0.00 
∆Wage Compliance in Taiwan-Owned (%) 182 0.88 14.54 -60.00 60.00 0.66 0.94 
∆Wage Compliance in Korea-Owned (%) 70 4.86 16.83 -20.00 80.00 6.92 3.64 
∆Wage Compliance in Malaysia-Owned (%) 45 1.33 8.94 -20.00 20.00 3.08 1.11 
∆Wage Compliance in Other Asia-Owned (%) 14 4.29 13.99 -20.00 40.00 12.00 4.00 
∆Wage Compliance in Domestically Owned 
(%) 32 -0.63 26.14 -80.00 60.00 -4.29 0.00 
         
Working Conditions (WC) Compliance (%) 614 85.69 6.5 62.99 97.64 84.22 87.19 
WC Compliance in Foreign-Owned (%) 582 85.94 6.32 62.99 97.64 84.5 87.34 
WC Compliance in West-Owned (%) 17 86.48 5.75 77.95 96.85 85.33 88.19 
WC Compliance in China-Owned (%) 114 80.74 6.52 58.27 93.7 78.03 83.54 
WC Compliance in Hong Kong-Owned (%) 113 84.02 8.09 60.63 97.64 80.11 87.24 
WC Compliance in Singapore-Owned (%) 27 85.39 7.59 67.72 96.06 81.19 88.98 
WC Compliance in Taiwan-Owned (%) 182 85.12 6.64 66.93 96.85 82.7 87.4 
WC Compliance in Korea-Owned (%) 70 85.04 6.11 72.44 95.28 83.53 86.69 
WC Compliance in Malaysia-Owned (%) 45 88.17 4.91 75.59 96.85 85.22 90.64 
WC Compliance in Other Asia-Owned (%) 14 81.5 6.3 68.5 89.76 77.95 85.67 
WC Compliance in Domestically Owned (%) 32 79.4 8.12 66.93 93.7 78.12 82.87 
        
∆ Working Conditions 614 1.76 4.91 -14.17 35.43 3.14 0.35 
∆WC in Foreign-Owned (%) 582 1.76 4.94 -14.17 35.43 3.21 0.34 
∆WC in West-Owned (%) 17 2.04 4.32 -7.87 11.02 4.43 -0.26 
∆WC  in China-Owned (%) 114 2.16 5.55 -7.87 35.43 3.28 0.94 
∆WC in Hong Kong-Owned (%) 113 1.79 5.16 -11.81 19.69 3.22 0.39 
∆WC in Singapore-Owned (%) 27 1.60 5.11 -6.30 15.75 6.12 -0.70 
∆WC in Taiwan-Owned (%) 182 1.33 4.89 -14.17 18.90 2.65 -0.11 
∆WC in Korea-Owned (%) 70 1.69 3.90 -7.09 12.60 3.06 0.72 
∆WC in Malaysia-Owned (%) 45 1.96 4.52 -7.87 15.75 2.67 0.70 
∆WC in Other Asia-Owned (%) 14 3.43 5.21 -7.09 11.81 4.57 1.10 
∆WC in Domestically Owned (%) 32 1.82 4.53 -5.51 11.81 2.08 0.69 
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Table 4a: Regression Results – Foreign Ownership and 
Wages/Working Conditions 
  1 2 3 4 
  Wages (1) Wages (2) 
Working 
Conditions (1) 
Working 
Conditions (2) 
Foreign  9.220 9.392 4.317 2.667 
 Ownership (5.599)* (3.955)** (1.518)*** (1.343)** 
Firm Age  1.143 -0.052 0.977 -0.500 
 (Years) (0.321)*** 0.424 (0.107)*** (0.144)*** 
Firm Size 0.208 0.244 0.132 0.214 
(100s of Workers)  (0.090)** (0.096)** (0.038)*** (0.032)*** 
Unionization 0.032 0.046 0.008 0.018 
 (% Workers) (0.024) (0.037) (0.008) (0.013) 
Constant 72.590 76.493 74.211 80.673 
  
(5.499)*** (4.331)*** (1.548)*** (1.470)*** 
Observations 936 936 936 936 
Firms 288 288 288 288 
R2 0.061 0.06 0.311 0.18 
• significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 
 R-squared within 
Robust standard errors in parentheses for columns one and three; columns two and four use an empirical method that 
does not permit robust standard error calculation. Regression results: Eq. 1, wages as the dependent variable with 
random effects (column 1) and between effects (column 2); and working conditions as the dependent variable with 
random effects (column 3) and between effects (column 4).  
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Table 4b: Regression Results – Disaggregated Foreign Ownership 
and Wages/Working Conditions 
 1 2 3 4 
  Wages (1) Wages (2) 
Working 
Conditions (1) 
Working 
Conditions (2) 
Firm Age  1.174 -0.049 0.987 -0.48 
 (Years) (0.328)*** (0.438) (0.108)*** (0.145)*** 
Firm Size 0.17 0.194 0.108 0.186 
(100s of Workers)  (0.095)* (0.100)* (0.039)*** (0.033)*** 
Unionization 0.034 0.049 0.008 0.016 
 (% Workers) (0.024) (0.038) (0.008) (0.012) 
West 8.965 8.157 4.58 2.25 
  
(6.592) (6.489) (2.139)** (2.144) 
China 5.369 5.135 1.342 0.017 
  
(6.089) (4.417) (1.701) (1.459) 
Hong Kong 9.353 10.794 3.506 3.111 
  
(6.016) (4.403)** (1.698)** (1.455)** 
Taiwan 9.152 9.393 5.368 3.615 
  
(5.821) (4.307)** (1.592)*** (1.423)** 
Korea 13.149 12.261 6.363 3.803 
  
(6.099)** (4.804)** (1.724)*** (1.587)** 
Malaysia 14.456 14.473 8.043 5.887 
  
(5.956)** (5.490)*** (1.809)*** (1.814)*** 
Singapore 11.425 11.416 4.72 2.276 
  
(6.485)* (6.122)* (2.222)** (2.023) 
Other Asia 8.978 10.871 1.951 2.569 
  
(7.537) (7.749) (2.806) (2.560) 
Constant 72.668 76.712 74.426 80.798 
  
(5.527)*** (4.369)*** (1.536)*** (1.443)*** 
Observations 936 936 936 936 
Firms 288 288 288 288 
R2 0.061 0.08 0.311 0.24 
• significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1 
 R-squared within 
Robust standard errors in parentheses for columns one and three; columns two and four use an empirical method that 
does not permit robust standard error calculation. Regression results: Eq. 1, wages as the dependent variable with 
random effects (column 1) and between effects (column 2); and working conditions as the dependent variable with 
random effects (column 3) and between effects (column 4).  
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Table 5a: Regression Results – Aggregated Working 
Conditions  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Firm Age  -3.512 -0.464 0.161 0.402 -0.068 0.196 
 (Years) (5.116) (1.160) (0.276) (0.280) (0.316) (0.289) 
Firm Size 0.251 0.188 0.427 0.506 0.342 0.431 
(100s of Workers) (0.286) (0.242) (0.257)* (0.280)* (0.238) (0.258)* 
Unionization 0.019 0.019 0.04 0.042   0.041 
 (% Workers) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)   (0.034) 
Visit # 3.067 1.273 -0.552 -1.435 -0.244 -0.777 
  
(3.099) (0.878) (0.738) (0.798)* (0.735) (0.877) 
Time Between 0.035   -0.098 -0.232 0.014 -0.034 
Visits (Months) (0.085)   (0.123) (0.143) (0.081) (0.195) 
Working 0.783 1 0.873 1 0.869 0.891 0.802 0.875 
Conditions (0.243)*** (0.194)*** (0.204)*** (0.217)*** (0.172)*** (0.209)*** 
Time           0.61 
(Years)           (1.582) 
Constant 27.974 12.536 1.888 21.684 1.801 -1221.638 
  
(27.764) (14.600) (2.080) (22.606) (1.977) (3174.486) 
Observations 614 981 614 614 769 614 
Firms 278 333 278 278 289 278 
R-Squared 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.08 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1
 = Working Conditions variable in levels (not differences) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regression results for Eq.2 (column 1), Eq. 2 with Time Between Visits 
excluded (2), Eq. 2a (3), Eq. 2a with monitor controls (4), Eq. 2a with unionization excluded (5), and Eq. 2a with a 
continuous time control (6). Reported R2 values are R2 within. 
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Table 5b: Regression Results – Aggregated Working 
Conditions (Continued)  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Firm Age (Years) -0.474 0.568 0.154 0.065 0.214 -0.049 
  
(0.799) (0.336)* (0.240) (0.555) (0.409) (0.544) 
Firm Size 1.079 0.097 0.226 0.808 0.146 0.771 
(100s of Workers) (0.670) (0.310) (0.291) (0.487)* (0.212) (0.496) 
Unionization 0.037 0.038 -0.007 0.089 0.007 0.065 
 (% Workers) (0.082) (0.037) (0.045) (0.049)* (0.025) (0.053) 
Visit # 1.982 -2.043 -0.553 -0.652 -0.245 -0.279 
  
(1.831) (0.890)** (0.729) (1.496) (0.861) (1.518) 
Time Between -0.074 -0.944 0.101 -0.205 0.035 -0.149 
Visits (Months) (0.190) (0.337)*** (0.098) (0.159) (0.095) (0.157) 
Working 0.762 0.892 0.436 1.141 0.924 0.844 
Conditions (0.361)** (0.240)*** (0.185)** (0.303)*** (0.286)*** (0.275)*** 
Constant -1.154 9.902 0.604 3.484 -0.385 3.144 
  
(8.789) (3.517)*** (2.423) (3.224) (2.745) (3.331) 
Observations 163 451 306 308 313 301 
Firms 71 207 130 148 162 165 
R-Squared 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.08 
 
      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Regression results for Eq.2a for original factories only (column 1); Eq. 2a for IMS factories (2); Eq. 2a for high-
compliance firms, >85% (3); Eq. 2a for low-compliance firms, <85% (4); Eq. 2a for high-compliance observations, 
>87% (5); and Eq. 2a for low-compliance observations, <87% (6). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reported 
R2 values are R2 within. 
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Table 5c: Regression Results – Disaggregated Working 
Conditions Variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Firm Age (Years) 0.213 0.211 0.212 0.216 0.221 0.192 
  
(0.272) (0.267) (0.271) (0.274) (0.274) (0.269) 
Firm Size 0.417 0.430 0.416 0.422 0.421 0.426 
(100s of Workers)  (0.253)* (0.250)* (0.249)* (0.254)* (0.253)* (0.255)* 
Unionization 0.041 0.041 0.04 0.042 0.042 0.036 
 (% Workers) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Visit # -0.572 -0.494 -0.626 -0.573 -0.559 -0.537 
  
(0.737) (0.711) (0.743) (0.737) (0.742) (0.740) 
Time Between -0.122 -0.153 -0.15 -0.117 -0.136 -0.109 
Visits (Months) (0.126) (0.137) (0.128) (0.129) (0.135) (0.131) 
Paperwork 0.330 0.359 0.293 0.329 0.324 0.329 
  
(0.126)*** (0.130)*** (0.123)** (0.126)*** (0.126)** (0.124)*** 
OSH 0.105 See  0.134 0.105 0.102 0.1 
  
(0.152) Table 5d1  (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) 
FACB 0.181 0.188 See  0.181 0.186 0.168 
  
(0.096)* (0.095)** Table 5d1  (0.096)* (0.099)* (0.096)* 
Internal Relations 0.362 0.355 0.349       
and Benefits (0.136)*** (0.142)** (0.133)***       
Benefits       0.121 See  0.127 
  
      (0.090) Table 5d1  (0.092) 
Internal Relations       0.239 0.24 See  
 
      (0.100)** (0.100)** Table 5d1  
Constant 1.740 1.672 2.084 1.688 1.769 1.880 
  
(2.078) (2.061) (2.083) (2.105) (2.110) (2.112) 
Observations 614 614 614 614 614 614 
R-squared Within 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regression results for Eq. 3 (column 1), Eq. 3 with OSH split (2), Eq. 3 with 
FACB split (3), Eq. 3 with Working Time/Core/Benefits split into Working Time/Core and Benefits (4), Eq. 3 with 
Benefits split (5), and Eq. 3 with Working Time/Core Standards split (6). Reported R2 values are R2 within.  
Coefficients of divided categories are shown in Table 5d below. 
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Table 5d: Regression Results – Disaggregated Working 
Conditions Variables (Continued, Subcategory Coefficients) 
 Category Subcategory 2 3 5 6 
Health/First Aid 0.000       
  
(0.057)       
Machine Safety 0.047       
  
(0.120)       
Temp/Vent/ 0.032       
 Noise/Light (0.052)       
Welfare Facilities 0.001       
  
(0.058)       
Operations/ 0.094       
 Physical Plant (0.083)       
Emergency  -0.020       
 Preparedness (0.056)       
Chemical Safety -0.029       
 OSH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
(0.026)       
Strikes   0.231     
  
  (0.119)*     
Unions   0.21     
  
  (0.122)*     
Shop Stewards   0.010     
FACB 
 
 
 
  
  (0.033)     
Workers'      0.089   
 Compensation     (0.073)   
Leave/Holidays     0.018   
    
  (0.054)   
Maternity Benefits     0.033   
Benefits 
 
 
 
  
 (0.056)   
Disputes       -0.029 
  
      (0.048) 
Management        0.011 
 Conduct       (0.036) 
Working Time       0.093 
  
      (0.047)** 
Liaison Officer       -0.012 
  
      (0.050) 
Core Standards       0.274 
  
  
  
 Core/ 
Working 
Time 
 
 
 
 
  
      (0.152)* 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regression results for Eq. 3 with OSH split (2), Eq. 3 with FACB split (3), 
Eq. 3 with Benefits split (5), and Eq. 3 with Working Time/Core Standards split (6). Reported R2 values are R2 
within. 
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Table 6a: Regression Results – Aggregated Foreign Ownership 
and Working Conditions  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Firm Age (Years) 0.167 0.381 -0.033 0.204 -0.210 0.568 
  
(0.272) (0.281) (0.315) (0.280) (0.714) (0.338)* 
Firm Size 0.420 0.506 0.327 0.424 0.954 0.101 
(100s of Workers)  (0.256) (0.275)* (0.239) (0.256)* (0.646) (0.311) 
Unionization 0.038 0.041   0.039 0.060 0.037 
 (% Workers) (0.033) (0.033)   (0.034) (0.074) (0.036) 
Visit # -0.629 -1.424 -0.339 -0.865 1.217 -2.043 
  
(0.735) (0.801)* (0.733) (0.867) (1.819) (0.892)** 
Time Between -0.088 -0.218 0.023 -0.021 -0.040 -0.966 
Visits (Months) (0.119) (0.141) (0.080) (0.189) (0.185) (0.348)*** 
Working 2.319 2.190 2.107 2.321 5.014 1.203 
Conditions (0.855)*** (0.954)** (0.711)*** (0.852)*** (1.892)*** (0.580)** 
Time       0.638     
(Years)       (1.556)     
Foreign-Owned  5.276 4.797 3.432 5.350 19.344 -0.241 
 (Dummy) (4.010) (3.856) (3.737) (4.033) (13.101) (2.820) 
Foreign-Owned* -1.519 -1.365 -1.394 -1.514 -4.472 -0.324 
 ∆Working Conditions (0.866)* (0.973) (0.733)* (0.864)* (1.894)** (0.631) 
Total Effect of WC in  0.800 0.824 0.714 0.807 0.542 0.880 
Foreign-Owned Firms (0.208)*** (0.223)*** (0.179)*** (0.213)*** (0.318)* (0.251)*** 
Constant -3.080 18.045 -1.485 -1,283.65 -19.768 10.304 
  
(4.092) (22.630) (3.978) (3122.476) (15.466) (4.731)** 
Observations 614 614 769 614 163 451 
Firms 278 278 289 278 71 207 
R2 0.10 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.20 0.10 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regression results for Eq. 4 (column 1), Eq. 4 with monitor controls (2), Eq. 4 
with unionization excluded (3), Eq. 4 with a continuous time variable (4), Eq. 4 for original firms only (5), and Eq. 4 
excluding the original firms (6). Reported R2 values are R2 within. 
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Table 6b: Regression Results - Disaggregated Working Conditions 
  
Working 
Conditions 
WC*Foreign 
Ownership 
Total Effect of WC in 
Foreign-Owned Factories 
Paperwork 1.704 -1.413 0.291 
  
(0.599)*** (0.608)** (0.124)** 
FACB -1.396 1.623 0.227 
  
(0.816)* (0.819)** (0.092)** 
Internal Relations 0.414 -0.211 0.204 
and Benefits (0.141)*** (0.174) (0.166) 
OSH 0.086 0.024 0.11 
  
(0.163) (0.098) (0.158) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Regression results for Eq. 3 with disaggregated working conditions variables.  
Coefficients for controls not shown due to their similarity to those presented in Table 6a. 
R2 Within: 0.14 
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Table 6c: Regression Results - Disaggregated Foreign Ownership 
Country of 
Ownership 
Working 
Conditions 
WC*Country 
of Ownership 
Total Effect of WC 
in Country's 
Factories 
West 2.312 -2.618 -0.306 
  
(0.868)*** (0.952)*** (0.401) 
China 2.312 -0.900 1.412 
  
(0.868)*** (0.981) (0.467)*** 
Hong Kong 2.312 -1.671 0.641 
  
(0.868)*** (0.929)* (0.384)* 
Taiwan 2.312 -1.562 0.750 
  
(0.868)*** (0.892)* (0.260)** 
Korea 2.312 -2.040 0.273 
  
(0.868)*** (1.028)** (0.560) 
Malaysia 2.312 -2.143 0.169 
  
(0.868)*** (0.952)** (0.429) 
Singapore 2.312 -2.125 0.188 
  
(0.868)*** (0.870)** (0.247) 
Other Asia 2.312 -1.111 1.201 
  
(0.868)*** (1.014) (0.575)** 
Cambodia 2.314     
  
(0.867)***     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Regression results for Eq. 3 with disaggregated foreign ownership variables.  
Coefficients for controls not shown due to their similarity to those presented in Table 6a. 
R2 Within: 0.11 
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Appendix A: Wage and Working Conditions Survey Questions  
Category Subcategory Q# IMS Question Original Question 
FACB Shop Stewards 16300 
Does management provide the 
shop stewards with everything 
required? 
Has the employer 
provided the shop 
stewards with an office, 
meeting room, working 
materials and poster-
displaying site? 
FACB Shop Stewards 16300   
Does the employer allow 
each shop steward two 
hours per week to 
perform his/her task 
while maintaining 
normal wages and 
benefits? 
FACB Shop Stewards 16400 
Does management get 
permission from the labour 
ministry before dismissing 
shop stewards?  
Have any shop stewards 
or candidates for shop 
stewards been dismissed 
from his/her 
work/function (a) from 
the employer (from 
his/her work)? 
FACB Shop Stewards 16400   
Was this authorized by 
the labour inspector? 
FACB Shop Stewards 16500 
Have the shop stewards been 
consulted and given their 
written opinion on 
redundancy? 
Have the shop stewards 
been consulted and given 
their written opinion on 
redundancy?  (Art. 284) 
FACB Strikes 43100 
Did management punish any 
workers for participating in the 
strike? 
Did the employer impose 
any sanctions on workers 
participating in any 
strike?  (A. 333) 
FACB Strikes 43400 
Did management reinstate all 
workers after the strike? 
Were all workers 
reinstated in their jobs at 
the end of a strike? 
FACB Strikes 43600 
Did management pay the 
striking workers' wages during 
the strike? 
If yes, did the employer 
pay the wages of the 
strikers for the duration 
of the strike? 
FACB Unions 30400 
Can workers freely form and 
join trade unions of their 
choice? 
Is there any indication 
that workers are 
prevented from forming 
or joining a trade union 
of their own choosing? 
(C. 87/98) 
FACB Unions 30500 
Has management discriminated 
against any worker because of 
the worker's union membership 
or union activities? 
Is there any indication 
that any worker has 
suffered disadvantages 
because of his/herunion 
membership or union 
activities: (see IMS 364 
below) 
FACB Unions 38900 
Does management interfere 
with workers or unions when 
they draw up their constitutions 
and rules, hold elections, or 
organize their activities, 
administration or finances? 
Have workers/trade 
unions been prevented 
from: (see IMS 390 
below) 
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FACB Unions 41500 
Are workers free not to join the 
union(s)? 
Is there any indication 
that workers are 
threatened/coerced to 
join a trade union? 
FACB Unions 41600 
Has management taken steps to 
bring the union(s) under its 
control?  
Is there any indication 
that the employer has 
done things to bring the 
union under the 
employers' control or 
domination? 
FACB Unions 41700 
Is any worker's job dependent 
on the worker not joining a 
union? 
Is there any indication 
that the workers' job is 
dependent on not joining 
a trade union? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Child Labor 28800 
Have monitors verified the 
employment of workers below 
age 15? 
Is there any indication of 
employment of children 
below the age of 12? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Child Labor 28800   
Is there any indication of 
employment of children 
between the ages of 12 
and 15? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Child Labor 29100 
Does management keep a 
register of workers who are 
under age 18? 
Does the employer keep 
a register of employed 
children below the age of 
18? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Compensation for  
Accidents/Illnesses 35300 
(212. Does management 
compensate workers correctly 
for work-related accidents and 
illnesses?)  What types of 
compensation owed to workers 
has management failed to pay 
correctly? 
Do workers receive any 
of the following forms of 
compensation for work 
related 
accidents/illnesses? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Compensation for  
Accidents/Illnesses 35302 
costs for medication, treatment 
and hospitalization 
costs for medical care 
and hospitalisation 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Compensation for  
Accidents/Illnesses 35303 
annuity for permanently 
disabled workers (20% or more 
disabled) 
an annuity for fatal 
accidents or permanent 
disability to the worker 
or his/her beneficiaries 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Compensation for  
Accidents/Illnesses 35304 
supplementary compensation 
for permanently disabled 
workers who require constant 
care 
supplementary 
compensation for 
permanently disabled 
workers who require 
constant care 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Compensation for  
Accidents/Illnesses 35305 funeral costs 
costs for funerals and 
survivors' pension 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Discipline/ 
Management 
Misconduct 19300 
Does management, including 
line supervisors, treat workers 
with respect? 
Is there evidence of 
indecent behaviour by 
employers/managers? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Discipline/ 
Management 
Misconduct 34701 
(70. Does management make 
any unauthorized deductions 
from workers' wages?) What 
What deductions are 
made from wages? Fines 
for misconduct/discipline 
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Benefits does management deduct? 
disciplinary fines  
(Art. 28) 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Discipline/ 
Management 
Misconduct 44700 
Are workers subject to 
unwelcome conduct of a sexual 
nature (physical contact, 
spoken words, or conduct that 
creates an intimidating or 
humiliating work 
environment)? 
Is there evidence of 
sexual harassment? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Discrimination 28100 
Does management dismiss 
pregnant workers or force them 
to resign? 
Is there evidence that 
women have been fired 
for becoming pregnant? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Discrimination 28400 
Does management discriminate 
against workers during hiring, 
employment, or termination 
based on their race, colour, sex, 
religion, creed, ancestry, social 
origin, or political opinion? 
Is there any indication 
that any worker has 
suffered disadvantages 
because of his/her race, 
colour, sex, creed, 
religion, political 
opinion, birth, national 
extraction, or social 
origin: at the time of 
recruitment? During 
employment? At 
termination of 
employment? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Discrimination 44300 
Does management dismiss 
workers or change their 
employment status or seniority 
during maternity leave? 
Have women been fired 
during maternity leave or 
at a date when the end 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Disputes 17700 
Has management implemented 
the conciliation agreement? 
If yes, was the agreement 
implemented? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Disputes 18300 
Did management implement 
the arbitration award? 
If yes, was the award 
implemented 
immediately? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Disputes 19000 
Did management implement 
conciliation agreements (if 
any)? 
If yes, was the agreement 
implemented? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Forced Labor 28500 
Is there any evidence of forced 
(involuntary) labour? 
Is there any evidence of 
work being undertaken: 
(see IMS 361 below) 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Forced Labor 36100 
In what form is forced labour is 
occurring? 
Is there any evidence of 
work being undertaken: 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Forced Labor 36105 
labour as punishment for 
holding views different from 
mainstream political thought 
as punishment for 
holding views different 
from management? 
Internal 
Relations 
and Forced Labor 36106 
labour as a means of labour 
discipline 
as a means of labour 
discipline? 
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Benefits 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Holidays/ 
Annual Leave/ 
Special Leave 10400 
Does management give 
workers who have worked one 
year or more any annual leave 
at all (paid or unpaid) or any 
annual leave compensation? 
Is paid annual leave 
given? (Art. 166) 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Holidays/ 
Annual Leave/ 
Special Leave 10500 
Does management give 
workers at least 18 days of paid 
annual leave each year? 
If yes, does this amount 
to one and a half days per 
month for continuous 
service? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Holidays/ 
Annual Leave/ 
Special Leave 11100 
Do workers get 7 days of paid 
special leave? 
What is the maximum 
amount of special leave 
days a worker can take 
per year? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Holidays/ 
Annual Leave/ 
Special Leave 11600 
Is the annual leave deducted 
only from the same year during 
which the worker took special 
leave? 
If the worker has taken 
all his/her annual leave, 
does the employer deduct 
the special leave taken 
from the workers' annual 
leave for the next year? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Liaison Officer 16600 
Has management appointed a 
liaison officer? 
Has an independent and 
neutral liaison officer 
been appointed/recruited 
by the employer? 
(SARACHOR NO. 
21/SRC/MOSALVY, 
1999) 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Liaison Officer 16700 
Did management consult with 
workers before appointing the 
liaison officer? 
If yes, were workers' 
consulted prior to the 
appointment? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Liaison Officer 17000 
Do workers have easy access to 
the liaison officer? 
If yes, do workers have 
easy access to the liaison 
officer? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Maternity Benefits 12700 
Do women workers get at least 
90 days of maternity leave? 
Do women workers 
receive maternity leave 
of 90 days?  (Art. 182) 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Maternity Benefits 12800 
Do women workers who have 
worked for more than one year 
get paid for maternity leave? 
Have workers that 
receive no wages during 
maternity leave been 
inservice for a period of 
one uninterrupted year? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Maternity Benefits 13000 
Can women do light work for 
two months after returning 
from maternity leave? 
Do women do light work 
for a period of two 
months after their 
maternity leave? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Maternity Benefits 13200 
Does management give 
workers one hour of paid time 
off for breast-feeding? 
Is time-off for 
breastfeeding provided 
for workers that have 
given birth less than one 
year ago? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Maternity Benefits 13600 
Does management pay the 
childcare costs of women 
employees? 
If there is no day care 
centre for children older 
than 18 months, does the 
employer pay female 
workers for the charges 
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for placing their children 
a day care centre? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits Maternity Benefits 34900 
 Do women receive the proper 
pay/benefits for maternity 
leave? 
Do women receive the 
proper pay/benefits for 
maternity leave?  
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Overtime 
Accommodation 10200 
Does management provide 
transportation or a place to 
sleep for workers who finish 
work between 22:00 and 
05:00? 
If yes, are workers that 
work anywhere between 
2200 and 0500 provided 
with a place to sleep 
when they finish?   
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Overtime 
Accommodation 10200   
If no, are these workers 
provide with 
transportation when they 
finish? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Regular Hours/ 
Weekly Rest 7600 
Are normal working hours 
more than 8 hours per day, 6 
days per week? 
What are the normal 
hours of work?  (Art.137)  
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Regular Hours/ 
Weekly Rest 7700 
Does management give 
workers at least 24 consecutive 
hours off per week? 
Is there a weekly rest 
break of at least 24 
consecutive hours? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Regular Hours/ 
Weekly Rest 8601 voluntary 
If yes, have workers 
voluntarily agreed to do 
so? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Regular Hours/ 
Weekly Rest 8602 exceptional 
If yes, is this for 
exceptional and urgent 
jobs? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Regular Hours/ 
Weekly Rest 8603 limited to 2 hours per day 
If yes, on average how 
many hours per week? 
Internal 
Relations 
and 
Benefits 
Regular Hours/ 
Weekly Rest 9401 
Work on holidays is not: 
voluntary 
 (20a. Are workers aware 
of their official holidays 
as determined by 
MOSALVY?  20b.  If 
yes, do they work on 
these days?) If yes, have 
they voluntarily agreed to 
do so? 
OSH Chemicals 23900 
Are chemicals properly stored 
in a separate area of the 
workplace? 
Are chemicals properly 
stored? 
OSH Chemicals 24100 
Does the factory have 
satisfactory exhaust ventilation 
in areas where chemicals are 
used? 
Has exhaust ventilation 
been installed in areas 
where chemicals are in 
use? 
OSH Chemicals 24100   
Could exhaust ventilation 
be improved? 
OSH Chemicals 24300 
Does management train 
workers who work with 
chemical substances how to use 
them safely? 
Are workers exposed to 
dangerous substances 
trained in the handling of 
these substances? 
OSH Chemicals 24600 Do workers who need it use the Do workers who need it 
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protective clothing and 
equipment that is provided? 
actually use this 
[protective] 
clothing/equipment? 
OSH 
Emergency 
Preparedness 21300 
Are procedures in place to 
handle emergencies (e.g., fire, 
explosion, natural disaster)?  
Are procedures in place 
to handle emergencies 
(such as fire, explosion, 
natural disaster)? 
OSH 
Emergency 
Preparedness 21400 
Are managers, supervisors and 
workers aware of these 
procedures? 
Are managers, 
supervisors and workers 
aware of these 
procedures? 
OSH 
Emergency 
Preparedness 21500 
Does the factory hold regular 
emergency drills? 
If yes, are regular 
emergency drills held? 
OSH 
Emergency 
Preparedness 21789 
Are all emergency exit doors 
clearly marked? 
Are emergency exits 
clearly marked, 
accessible and unlocked? 
OSH 
Emergency 
Preparedness 21789 
Are all emergency exit doors 
unlocked during working 
hours, including overtime? 
Are emergency exits 
clearly marked, 
accessible and unlocked? 
OSH 
Emergency 
Preparedness 21789 
Are all emergency exit doors 
accessible? 
Are emergency exits 
clearly marked, 
accessible and unlocked? 
OSH 
Emergency 
Preparedness 22100 
Are there enough regularly 
serviced fire extinguishers 
within easy reach of workers? 
Are fire extinguishers 
within easy reach of 
workers? 
OSH 
Emergency 
Preparedness 22100   
Are fire extinguishers 
regularly serviced? 
OSH Health/First Aid 13400 
Does the factory have a 
functioning and accessible 
nursing room? 
Is a nursing room 
provided in or near the 
enterprise (for those 
enterprises employing 
100 or more women, art 
186)? 
OSH Health/First Aid 22400 
Are there enough properly 
stocked first-aid boxes in the 
workplace that are easily 
accessible to workers?)  
Is a properly stocked first 
aid kit available? 
OSH Health/First Aid 22500 
Does management provide 
periodic first aid training to 
workers? 
Is there a trained person 
available to provide first 
aid? 
OSH Health/First Aid 22600 
Does the factory have an 
infirmary? (if factory has less 
than 50 workers, tick N/A) 
Does the enterprise (if 
employing more than 50 
workers) have a  
permanent infirmary?  
(A. 242) 
OSH Health/First Aid 22700 
Does the infirmary have 
enough beds?  
(Information was given 
in the comment space for 
question 74) 
OSH Health/First Aid 22900 
Does the infirmary have 
enough medicine and medical 
equipment? 
Is the infirmary equipped 
to provide emergency 
care? 
OSH Health/First Aid 23100 
Do workers have to pay for 
medicine or treatment provided 
by the infirmary? 
Is it [treatment by the 
infirmary] subject to an 
restrictions/fees? 
OSH Machine Safety 25400 
Are the machines well 
maintained? 
Are machines regularly 
maintained? 
OSH Machine Safety 25600 
Are proper guards installed on 
all dangerous moving parts of 
machines and power 
Are proper guards 
attached to all dangerous 
moving parts of 
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transmission equipment? (not 
including needle guards) 
machines   and power 
transmission equipment? 
OSH Machine Safety 25700 
Are electrical wires and 
switches properly installed? 
Are electrical wires and 
switches safe and in good 
condition? 
OSH Machine Safety 25800 
Are electrical wires and 
switches well maintained? 
Are electrical wires and 
switches regularly 
maintained? 
OSH Machine Safety 26000 
 Are transformers or earth 
leakage devices used when 
there is a danger of shock? 
Are transformers or earth 
leakage devices used 
when there is a danger  
of shock? 
OSH Machine Safety 26100 
Are workers trained to use 
machines and equipment 
safely? 
Are workers trained in 
the proper/safe use of 
machines and 
equipment? 
OSH 
Temperature/ 
Ventilation/ 
Noise/Light 24800 
Is the workplace free of 
reflection and glare? 
Is lighting free of 
reflection and glare? 
OSH 
Temperature/ 
Ventilation/ 
Noise/Light 24900 
Are light fittings in good 
condition? 
Are light fittings in good 
condition? 
OSH 
Temperature/ 
Ventilation/ 
Noise/Light 25200 
Is hearing protection provided 
to all workers who need it? 
Is hearing protection 
provided to all workers 
who need it? 
OSH 
Temperature/ 
Ventilation/ 
Noise/Light 26500 
Are heat levels in the factory 
acceptable? 
What are the results of 
the temperature 
measurements taken  
throughout the factory 
premises? 
OSH 
Temperature/ 
Ventilation/ 
Noise/Light 26600 
Does the factory have adequate 
ventilation and air circulation? 
Is adequate ventilation 
provided to all workers 
throughout the factory? 
OSH 
Temperature/ 
Ventilation/ 
Noise/Light 26800 
Are dust levels in the factory 
acceptable? 
What are the results of 
the dust measurements 
taken throughout  the 
factory premises? 
OSH Welfare Facilities 13789 
Does management provide safe 
drinking water? 
Does the workplace have 
an adequate supply of 
safe drinking water? 
OSH Welfare Facilities 13789 
Does management provide 
enough drinking water? 
Does the workplace have 
an adequate supply of 
safe drinking water? 
OSH Welfare Facilities 13789 
Are there enough drinking 
water stations? 
Does the workplace have 
an adequate supply of 
safe drinking water? 
OSH Welfare Facilities 14400 
Does management 
unreasonably restrict workers 
from drinking water? 
Are there any restrictions 
on drinking water? 
OSH Welfare Facilities 14500 
Does the factory have the 
number of toilets required? 
Does the factory have the 
number of toilets 
required? 
OSH Welfare Facilities 15000 
Are the toilets cleaned 
regularly? 
Are toilet facilities 
regularly cleaned? 
OSH Welfare Facilities 15100 
Are the toilets close to the 
workplace?  
Are toilet and washing 
facilities close to the 
work area?  
OSH Welfare Facilities 15200 
Is enough soap and water 
available near the toilets? 
Is soap and water 
available for washing? 
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OSH Welfare Facilities 15300 
Does management 
unreasonably restrict workers 
from using the toilets? 
Are there any restrictions 
on toilet use? 
OSH 
Workplace 
Operations 26970 Is the workplace clean? 
Are all work areas and 
access paths kept tidy 
and clean? 
OSH 
Workplace 
Operations 26970 Is the workplace tidy? 
Are all work areas and 
access paths kept tidy 
and clean? 
OSH 
Workplace 
Operations 27100 
Are access paths wide enough 
to allow for two-way traffic? 
Are access paths wide 
enough to allow two-way 
traffic? 
OSH 
Workplace 
Operations 27200 
Are access paths free of 
obstruction? 
Are all work areas and 
access paths free of 
obstruction and hazards? 
OSH 
Workplace 
Operations 27300 
Is the surface of transport 
routes even and not slippery? 
Is the surface of transport 
routes even and not 
slippery? 
OSH 
Workplace 
Operations 27400 
Can workers easily reach 
switches, controls, tools and 
materials? 
Are switches, tools, 
controls and materials 
placed within easy reach  
of workers? 
OSH 
Workplace 
Operations 27500 
Do workers have enough 
equipment for carrying heavy 
or bulky materials? 
Are workers provided 
with push-carts and other 
wheeled devices for   
carrying heavy or bulky 
materials 
OSH 
Workplace 
Operations 27600 
Do workers who work sitting 
down have adjustable chairs 
with backrests? 
Are seated workers 
provided with chairs with 
a sturdy backrest? 
OSH 
Workplace 
Operations 28000 
Do workers have to bend over 
or raise their hands to work 
because the work height is not 
adequately adjusted? 
Is work height adjusted 
to the needs of individual 
workers to avoid  
bending postures or high 
hand positions? 
Paperwork 
Collective 
Agreements 17400 
If there is no collective 
agreement, did the parties 
inform the labour inspector 
about the collective dispute(s), 
so the dispute(s) could be 
conciliated? 
If yes, but there is no 
collective agreement, did 
the parties notify the 
labour inspector for 
conciliation? 
Paperwork 
Collective 
Agreements 19600 
Is the collective agreement at 
least as good for workers as the 
Labour Law? 
If yes, how do the 
provisions compare with 
the Labour Code? 
Paperwork 
Collective 
Agreements 19900 
Has management registered the 
collective agreement with the 
labour ministry? 
If yes, has it been 
properly registered (Art. 
4 Prakas 197/98) 
Paperwork 
Collective 
Agreements 20100 
Has management posted the 
collective agreement in the 
workplace? 
If yes, has the registered 
CA been posted 
throughout the 
establishment? 
Paperwork 
Communication 
with Labor 
Ministry 8000 
Has management obtained the 
required authorizations from 
the labour ministry? (For 
rotating weekly rest days) 
(Has weekly time off 
ever been suspended?) If 
yes, and in case of rest by 
rotating staff, have the 
necessary authorisations 
been obtained? 
Paperwork 
Communication 
with Labor 8900 
Does management get 
permission from the Labour 
if yes, has the employer 
requested MOSALVY 
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Ministry Inspector before workers work 
overtime? 
for such overtime to be 
taken? 
Paperwork 
Communication 
with Labor 
Ministry 16900 
Has management notified the 
labour ministry about the 
appointment of the liaison 
officer? 
If yes, has MOSALVY 
been notified of the 
appointment? 
Paperwork 
Communication 
with Labor 
Ministry 20900 
Does management regularly 
provide a summary report of 
work-related accidents and 
illnesses to the relevant 
authorities?  
Does the enterprise 
notify the relevant 
authorities of work 
related  
accidents/illnesses? (Art. 
1 Prakas 58/98) 
Paperwork 
Communication 
with Labor 
Ministry 20900   
If yes, do they do so 
within the required 24 
hours of the 
accident/illness? 
Paperwork Contracts/Hiring 1600 
Do workers have to pay 
someone to get a job? 
Is there any indication 
that workers had to pay 
someone to 
Paperwork Contracts/Hiring 2200 
Do the employment contracts 
specify the terms and 
conditions of employment? 
If yes, does it stipulate 
the terms of 
employment? 
Paperwork Contracts/Hiring 34706 
(70. Does management make 
any unauthorized deductions 
from workers' wages?) What 
does management deduct? the 
cost of a bond or guarantee to 
get or keep the worker's job 
What deductions are 
made from wages? Job 
placement fee 
Paperwork 
Informing 
Workers 5100 
Has management posted 
minimum wage information in 
the workplace? 
Has the minimum wage 
been posted in the 
workplace and in 
payment and recruitment 
offices? (Art. 109) 
Paperwork 
Informing 
Workers 5300 
Does management provide 
clearly written pay slips to 
workers? 
Do workers get a record 
of wages paid to them? 
Paperwork 
Informing 
Workers 5500 
Do workers understand the 
calculation of wages? 
If yes, do they 
understand the wage 
calculations? 
Paperwork 
Informing 
Workers 8100 
Does management keep an up-
to-date list showing each 
worker's schedule for weekly 
time off? 
If yes, and in case of rest 
by rotating staff, is a 
special list indicating the 
names of workers and 
their time off being kept 
and updated? 
Paperwork 
Informing 
Workers 10300 
Does management post the list 
of public holidays in the 
factory? 
Are workers aware of 
their official holidays as 
determined by 
MOSALVY? 
Paperwork 
Informing 
Workers 16800 
Did management inform 
workers about the appointment 
of the liaison officer?  
If yes, has the 
appointment been 
announced to the 
workers? 
Paperwork 
Internal 
Regulations 100 
Does the factory have internal 
regulations?  
Does the enterprise have 
internal regulations? 
(Art. 23 and Notice 9/97) 
Paperwork 
Internal 
Regulations 200 
Do the internal regulations 
comply with the labour law? 
If yes, do they comply 
with the labour law? 
Paperwork Internal 300 Were worker representatives If yes, were workers 
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Regulations consulted on the internal 
regulations when they were 
written or amended? 
consulted on the internal 
regulations? 
Paperwork 
Internal 
Regulations 400 
Have the internal regulations 
been posted in the workplace? 
If yes, have internal 
regulations been 
communicated to 
workers? 
Paperwork 
Internal 
Regulations 500 
Are the internal regulations 
legible? If yes, what language? 
Paperwork 
Internal 
Regulations 500   
If yes, are they placed in 
a proper and accessible 
place (such as work 
place, application room ) 
and kept clean and 
legible? 
Paperwork 
Internal 
Regulations 600 
Have the internal regulations 
been approved by a labour 
inspector? 
If yes, have internal 
regulations been signed 
off by a labour inspector? 
Paperwork 
Regular 
Hours/Weekly 
Rest 9900 
Does management get 
permission from the Labour 
Inspector before suspending 
the weekly break?  
(19a. Has weekly time 
off ever been 
suspended?) If yes, is the 
required authorisation 
obtained prior to 
suspension? 
Paperwork 
Safety 
Documentation 20200 
Does the factory have a written 
health and safety policy? 
Does the enterprise have 
a written policy or 
guidelines on OSH? 
Paperwork 
Safety 
Documentation 20400 
Is the health and safety policy 
written in Khmer? 
If yes, Is the policy 
written in Khmer? 
Paperwork 
Safety 
Documentation 20600 
Do workers and supervisors 
understand the health and 
safety policy? 
If yes, is the policy 
known to all workers and 
supervisors? 
Paperwork 
Safety 
Documentation 20700 
Has management posted safety 
and health information in 
Khmer (e.g., posters and signs) 
in the workplace? 
Are safety 
posters/notices 
displayed? 
Paperwork 
Safety 
Documentation 20700   
If yes, are they written in 
Khmer? 
Paperwork 
Safety 
Documentation 20800 
Does management keep a 
record of work-related 
accidents and illnesses? 
Does the enterprise keep 
a record of accidents? 
Paperwork 
Safety 
Documentation 20800   
Does the enterprise keep 
a record of work-related 
illnesses? 
Paperwork 
Safety 
Documentation 23500 
Does management keep an 
inventory of all chemicals 
stored at the workplace? 
Is there an inventory kept 
of all chemicals on the 
work site? 
Paperwork 
Safety 
Documentation 23600 
Does management have safety 
data sheets for chemicals used 
at the workplace? 
Are safety data sheets 
held for chemicals kept 
on site? 
Paperwork 
Safety 
Documentation 23700 
Do workers understand the 
content of the safety data 
sheets? 
Are workers aware of 
and understand the 
content of such data 
sheets? 
Paperwork 
Safety 
Documentation 35200 
Has management failed to take 
steps to ensure workers' 
occupational health and safety?   
 
